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“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”1 
-Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 1791 
Introduction 
In an 1807 letter, John Adams wrote to Mercy Otis Warren, stating, “I was always for a 
free republic, not a democracy, which is as arbitrary, tyrannical, bloody, cruel, and intolerable a 
government as that of Phalaris with his bull is represented to have been.”2 Adams’s reference to 
Greek tyrant, Phalaris, and his brazen bull—which was used to roast people alive—is telling. 
Democracy may be held today as among the highest values of the American system of 
government, but the American founders looked upon democracy with suspicious eyes. 
Antidemocratic notions can be jarring and displeasing to modern sensibilities, but such reactions 
are commonly due to a lack of understanding regarding the framers and their devotion to Natural 
Law philosophy. Such an understanding can only be realized through an analysis of the theory of 
Natural Law.  
Natural Law philosophy subscribes to the notion that individual rights are fundamental, 
inherent, inborn, and precede government. Unlike legal positivism, which asserts that rights are 
established and endowed by government, followers of Natural Law believe that rights are 
derived by nature, and nature’s God, and that the only legitimate form of government is one that 
protects individual inalienable rights. It is a view commonly rejected by those who believe in the 
administrative state and the virtuousness of institutions. Natural Law does not find a lot of 
supporters from those who seek to enlarge government or expand its powers, because the very 
                                                          
     1 “Ninth Amendment (ratified 1791),” U.S. Constitution, The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter (New 
York: Mentor, 1961), 523. 
     2 John Adams, letter to Mercy Otis Warren, July 30, 1807, accessed November 27, 2016, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-5199. 
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notion of Natural Law philosophy limits governmental powers to that which protects individual 
rights of life, liberty, property, and conscience. There are important historic exceptions to this, 
however. For example, northern abolitionist and Secretary of State from 1861 to 1869, William 
Seward, asserted the supremacy of the “higher law”3 the nation was beholden to which 
superseded any supposed protections the U.S. Constitution held to retain slavery. Seward stated 
that “one who is equal to another cannot be the owner or property of that other… [slavery] is 
repugnant to the law of nature…”4 This example underscores Natural Law tradition in American 
philosophical thought. Thus, Natural Law sentiment, which flowered during the Civil War era 
and provided the moral and philosophical reasoning for slavery’s obliteration, had its seed 
planted in the founding era. This was the same ethical argumentation which had informed the 
political thinking of the framers. It provided the ideological foundations behind the debates over 
a new system of government during the late 1780s, and it underlies the synthesis of Federalist 
and Antifederalist thought enshrined in the Ninth Amendment. However out of vogue today, 
Natural Law informed the founders’ worldview. 
Political scientist Michael P. Zuckert states, “Rights in their proper sense arise when 
human beings come to recognize a need for reciprocity in rights, when they recognize that to 
claim a right for oneself requires accepting the same right in others. That system of mutual 
recognition constitutes the system of natural duties correlative with natural rights.”5 Zuckert 
points to a paradox of the American political tradition of obsessing over the concept of rights. 
“Although the theme of rights obviously goes back to the founding era, those who are concerned 
                                                          
     3 William Seward, “Higher Law Speech,” The Works of William H. Seward, George E. Baker, ed. (New York: 
Redfield, 1853), vol. I. Furman University Digital Archives. http://eweb.furman.edu/~benson/docs/seward.htm. 
      4 Ibid. 
     5 Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 74. 
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with rights in the contemporary context hardly look to the founding period on the question, while 
those who study the founding have more or less abandoned the perspective of rights.”6 This is 
unfortunate. The challenging issues of the founding era, including slavery and the subservient 
role of women, have muted historical scholarship concerning the philosophy of rights during the 
American founding. The result has been a dearth of historians taking up the matter. Instead, the 
discussion has been dominated by political scientists and legal theorists, if the discussion has 
occurred at all. Historians have room to enter this territory, and the field would benefit from it 
greatly. An historical examination of how Natural Law philosophy informed the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights—with particular focus on the Ninth Amendment—is long overdue. 
The framers imbued the United States system of constitutional government with crucial 
Natural Law-based safeguards. These safeguards were championed both by supporters of the 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the Federalists, and those against ratification, the so-called 
Antifederalists. These protections included independence of the courts and the powers of the 
Senate, advocated by Federalists, and the protection of individual rights—freedom of speech, 
conscience, the press—by Antifederalists. A synthesis of Federalist and Antifederalist Natural 
Law philosophy can thus be found in the Bill of Rights generally and the Ninth Amendment 
specifically; this will be the locus of this work. 
The governmental system of the United States has been successful because of the 
constant push and pull between democratic republicanism and liberal individualism. This tension 
is illustrated in modern political parties—Republicans and Democrats, Greens and Libertarians, 
etc. The same stress between democracy and liberalism, local control versus national power, and 
                                                          
     6 Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, 10. 
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the inherent rights of the individual contrasted with the needs of the collective, played out in the 
earliest days of the republic. These opposing yet complimentary creeds were argued by 
Federalists and Antifederalists alike. They were not advocated across cleanly-divided lines. 
Indeed, while Federalists largely argued for concentration of centralized power in a new national 
government in the late 1780s, Antifederalists supported certain liberal/undemocratic—even 
antidemocratic—principles which would secure individual rights. Additionally, even as 
Antifederalists raised concerns about protecting rights of speech and the press, the Federalists 
inserted certain individual rights protections into the body of the Constitution, including the right 
of habeas corpus.7 It is important to note this, because Federalists and Antifederalists often 
argued upon similar principles. Both raised concerns about concentrated power in the wrong 
hands. It should thus be stated that democratic principles of the American system of government 
are essential to its strength and its agile ability to reform itself. Democracy, however, is merely 
half the story, and it was Federalists as well as Antifederalists who ensured undemocratic 
protections against abuses of power and the violation of individual rights. 
This paper will offer an examination of the twin pillars of historiography concerning the 
motivations behind the drafting and ratification of the United States Constitution, Charles 
Beard’s economic thesis and Bernard Bailyn’s ideological thesis. It will further deliberate on the 
ratification debates which followed the drafting of the Constitution and survey how the debates 
informed the adding of additional amendments, which came to be known as the Bill of Rights. 
One of the most crucial characteristics of the American system will also be discussed: the 
                                                          
     7 A writ of habeas corpus, Latin for “you have the body,” is a right derived from English common law. Cornell 
University Law School’s Legal Information Institute explains the writ of habeas corpus as a legal right “used to 
bring a prisoner or other detainee (e.g. institutionalized mental patient) before the court to determine if the person's 
imprisonment or detention is lawful.  A habeas petition proceeds as a civil action against the State agent (usually a 
warden) who holds the defendant in custody. It can also be used to examine any extradition processes used, amount 
of bail, and the jurisdiction of the court.” https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus.  
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independent judiciary, including its deliberately undemocratic nature at the level of the appellate 
courts. Finally, the Ninth Amendment will be scrutinized because of its unique status in law and 
American intellectual history. The Ninth Amendment, perhaps more than any other single 
sentence in the entire Constitution, reflects the Natural Law philosophy of the Federalists and 
Antifederalists.  
A Century of Historiography 
To properly approach a substantive discussion of how Natural Law informed Federalists 
and Antifederalists during ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, some attention must 
first be given to the historiography over the past century regarding the motivation behind the 
Constitution. The first century of scholarship that followed ratification of the Constitution was of 
the classically Whig, nineteenth-century, approach: honoring the accomplishments of the framers 
without questioning too closely the motivations and self-interests of the participants. Conflicting 
interpretations then replaced this orthodox view in the twentieth century. Two separate and 
opposing viewpoints would vie for preeminence, and continue to do so in the twenty-first 
century. These opposing interpretations can be described as the Economic Thesis by Charles 
Beard, and the Ideological Thesis by Bernard Bailyn. 
 In 1913, Charles Beard ushered in a Marxist-influenced school of thought, often referred 
to today as the Progressive school, which examined the economic motivations of the framers. 
Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913) argues that economic self-interest 
largely defined and explained the desire for a stronger central government on the part of the 
Federalists. Beard contends that the “overwhelming majority of members, at least five-sixths, 
were immediately, directly, and personally interested in the outcome of their labors at 
Philadelphia, and were to a greater or less extent economic beneficiaries from the adoption of the 
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Constitution.”8  The economic thesis soon overtook the historical field of the early American 
republic and dominated the conversation for the next several decades. Beard’s thesis perfectly fit 
into the Progressive school method, which became the prevailing view and approach to history in 
the first half of the twentieth century. More than merely fitting into a certain psychological 
matrix at a convenient moment in time, however, Beard’s economic thesis offered a new and 
credible critique of the framers’ motivations. Many of his arguments were convincing and shed 
new light upon the founding era. Beard asserted that support for the U.S. Constitution was 
carried principally by interests connected to “money, public securities, manufactures, and trade 
and shipping.”9 At the heart of Beard’s economic thesis is his assertion that the U.S. Constitution 
was “essentially an economic document based upon the concept that the fundamental private 
rights of property are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular 
majorities.”10  
Among the many supporters of the economic thesis of the Constitution was Jackson T. 
Main. In the 1950s and 1960s, Main offered more primary data than Beard had done to argue the 
thesis of economic self-interest and that support and rejection over ratification fell along class 
lines. “Main was close to Beard in his emphasis on class conflict—and he had the evidence of 
contemporary testimony to prove it.”11 Main was arguably the most loyal champion of Beard and 
the economic thesis in the middle of the twentieth century. Rather than focusing too much on the 
limitations of Beard’s work, which Beard himself had admitted was “’frankly fragmentary,’ 
                                                          
     8 Charles Beard, “An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,” Essays On The Making Of The Constitution, 
ed. Leonard W. Levy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 6. 
     9 Ibid., 31. 
     10 Ibid. 
     11 Leonard W. Levy, Essays On The Making Of The Constitution, ed. Leonard W. Levy, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 144. 
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designed to open new fields for research rather than to present a completed study,”12 Main 
sought to flesh out the economic thesis and bring forth a more comprehensive analysis. Doing so, 
Main became more resolute regarding the economic thesis by affirming that the “fact is that… 
more than half of those who signed the constitution, were rich, and others were well to do… 
[The Federalists comprised] precisely what Beard said they were: a ‘consolidated group.’”13 
Supporters of the economic thesis in the twenty-first century have attempted to utilize 
still more hard data to prove their case. Economist Robert A. McGuire, in his 2004 book, To 
Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution, 
introduced a series of statistics and analyzed the occupations of the Federalists—more so than 
any of his predecessors—to analyze their economic motivations. In the opening of To Form a 
More Perfect Union, McGuire states, rather practically, “Constitutions are the products of those 
who frame and adopt them.”14 McGuire also utilized, to great effect, the arguments of the 
framers themselves, stating that “whether real or imagined, economic and other problems were 
used to justify the Philadelphia convention.”15 
A crucial difference exists, however, in the original economic thesis of Charles Beard and 
the more recent economic thesis of Robert A. McGuire. Beard utilized a form of economic 
determinism to assert that economic self-interest was the motivator for creating a stronger central 
government on the part of the Federalists. McGuire’s newer thesis is more nuanced and does not 
entirely discount ideology. Nor does McGuire question why these men of social and economic 
                                                          
     12 Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 4. 
     13 Jackson T. Main, “The Beard Thesis Defended,” Essays On The Making Of The Constitution, ed. Leonard W. 
Levy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 152. 
     14 Robert A. McGuire, To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States 
Constitution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 8. 
     15 Ibid., 50. 
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prominence would be the ones to participate in this restructuring. “[I]t is difficult to imagine any 
society that would choose individuals with no rank and no distinction, or influence, to participate 
in constitutional reform.”16  
By the mid-1950s, the economic thesis of the Constitution began to be seriously 
questioned and critiqued by historians. One of the most vocal and effective of these critics was 
Cecelia M. Kenyon. Her critique of Beard’s thesis includes attacks upon his ultimate 
conclusions. Kenyon argues, in “Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of 
Representative Government” that Beard had completely ignored, or unfairly dismissed, 
philosophical and ideological motivations. She reasons that the ideological context of the 
Constitution “was as important in determining its form as were the economic interests and 
motivations of its framers… the failure of Beard and his followers to examine this context has 
rendered their interpretation of the Constitution and its origin necessarily partial and 
unrealistic.”17 Kenyon further adds that Beard’s thesis concerning motivation behind the creation 
of the Constitution was “unrealistic and unhistorical.”18  
One of Kenyon’s most pointed criticisms of Beard’s thesis, which is ultimately relevant 
to the thesis provided in this work, was Beard’s fundamental misunderstanding of certain 
undemocratic values the Antifederalists actually shared with the Federalists. Kenyon stated, in 
her 1963 article, “’An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution’ After Fifty Years,” that it 
was true the “Founding Fathers had some doubts that the will of the majority would always be 
wise, or right, or just. But it is also true that those who opposed the Constitution had these same 
                                                          
     16 McGuire, To Form a More Perfect Union, 54. 
     17 Cecelia M. Kenyon, “Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government,” 
William and Mary Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1955): 5. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1923094. 
     18 Ibid., 43. 
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doubts… Beard did not report these Antifederalist ideas, and apparently either did not notice 
them, or did not see the significance they had for his theory.”19 This is a crucial oversight by 
Beard. His assumption that Federalists were antidemocratic hoarders of wealth and power while 
Antifederalists were modest farmers who championed democracy was just what Kenyon said it 
was: unhistorical. Kenyon’s claim that the Constitution was ideologically motivated found 
support from many scholars, including Bernard Bailyn. 
Bernard Bailyn first approached the ideological impulses of the framers by examining 
surviving pamphlets of the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary eras. By doing so, he became 
convinced that both the American Revolution and the subsequent drafting of the Constitution 
carried significant philosophical underpinnings. Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution (1967) maintains that the Constitution “is the final and climactic expression 
of ideology of the American Revolution.”20 Bailyn describes the writing and ratification debates 
of the Constitution as being the third and final phase of the ideological origins of the American 
Revolution. Bailyn asserts that the first phase was the pre-revolution arguments of liberty, the 
second phase was the military reality of revolution itself, leading to the end of the war and the 
third phase: the realization of the ideology of the revolution—brought into practice under the 
Constitution.21  
Bailyn’s ideological thesis was arguably as impactful and paradigm-shifting in the second 
half of the twentieth century as Beard’s economic thesis had been in the first. Nonetheless, his 
                                                          
     19 Cecelia Kenyon, “’An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution’ After Fifty Years (1963),” reprinted in 
Men of Little Faith: Selected Writings of Cecelia Kenyon (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 
2002), 166. 
     20 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 321. 
     21 Ibid., 323. 
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interpretation was criticized by the emerging social history movement of the 1970s, which was 
motivated by the exploration of the historically ignored histories of women, minorities, and the 
poor: the politically and economically disenfranchised. The social history movement generally 
supported Beard’s thesis. Nevertheless, Bernard Bailyn’s ideological thesis not only shifted the 
scholarship of the history of the American founding for a generation, but students of Bailyn have 
championed his interpretation ever since. 
One of Bailyn’s most prominent students is Gordon S. Wood. His works include The 
Creation of the American Republic: 1776 – 1787 (1969), The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution (1991), and Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789 – 1815 (2009). 
In addition to promoting the ideological thesis in his work, Wood criticized Beard’s 
characterization of the economic circumstances of the 1783 – 1787 era. He charges that Beard 
downplayed the economic realities of the 1780s, implying treachery on the part of the Federalists 
which Wood utterly rejects. “Historians [such as Beard] who have minimized the criticalness of 
conditions in the 1780s have naturally tended to see the movement for the Constitution as 
something in the nature of a conspiracy by a few without widespread justification in the social 
and economic realities of the period.”22 Thus, Wood is among historians who do not reject the 
economic thesis entirely, but have found Beard’s analysis to be too deterministic. 
Herbert J. Storing added to the criticism of Beard in the 1970s, although he too agreed 
economics played a role in the motivations of the Federalists and Antifederalists. Storing 
nevertheless found Beard’s thesis ultimately too simplistic. Echoing Cecelia Kenyon’s critiques, 
Storing noted that Beard’s thesis “tends to see simple democratic agrarians among the 
                                                          
     22 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776 – 1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1969), 394. 
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Antifederalists as it tends to see self-seeking commercial oligarchs among Federalists. There is 
some basis for this view, but the picture is thin and distorted.”23 
Primary source evidence supports the point that economics certainly were a concern 
across many of the colonies. This can be seen, for example, in an engraving by Amos Doolittle in 
1787 during the ratification debate era. Doolittle lived in Connecticut and recognized the 
importance of strengthening the economy by means championed by the Federalists, including the 
implementation of uniform currency and the elimination of paper money. In Doolittle’s piece of 
political folk art, Connecticut is symbolized as a wagon loaded with debts and paper money. The 
weight of the debt has caused the wagon to sink into mud. The driver of the wagon warns, 
"Gentlemen this Machine is deep in the mire and you are divided as to its releaf."24 
It should be noted that just as supporters of Beard have sought to clarify or add to his 
initial thesis—or point to elements of its limitations—some scholars who have been largely 
supportive of Bailyn’s ideological thesis have similarly highlighted certain weaknesses. This 
includes anarcho-capitalist economist, Murray Rothbard. In his article, “Modern Historians 
Confront the American Constitution,” Rothbard argues, “One problem with the generally correct 
Bailyn thesis is its exclusive emphasis on ideology, as it affected the minds and hearts of the 
Americans.”25 Just as Beard could have benefited from giving some attention to ideology, Bailyn 
could have given at least a modicum of consideration to economic motivators. 
                                                          
     23 Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were FOR: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the 
Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 4. 
     24 Amos Doolittle. “The looking glass for 1787. A house divided against itself cannot stand. Mat. chap. 13th 
verse 26.” 1 print : engraving and rocker work, with watercolor on laid paper ; 28.7 x 36.7 cm. (image). New Haven, 
1787. Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008661778/. 
     25 Murray Rothbard, “Modern Historians Confront the American Revolution,” Literature of Liberty: A Review of 
Liberal Thought 1, no. 1 (January/March, 1978): mises.org/library/modern-historians-confront-american-revolution 
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The twenty-first century has seen more supporters of Bailyn’s ideological thesis, 
including academics outside of the field of history. Randy Barnett, Professor of Law and Legal 
Theory at Georgetown University Law Center, in Restoring the Lost Constitution (2004), 
contends unwaveringly that the Natural Law principles of the framers were at the forefront of 
their motivations. Barnett maintains that the Constitution must be viewed in its proper 
ideological context, and that the Supreme Court has, throughout the nation’s history, made a 
series of mistakes for not abiding by a “presumption of liberty”26 precept. Barnett also examines 
the role of the Ninth Amendment in understanding the philosophy and motivations of the 
framers, which will be explored further in a later section of this work. 
The dispute between the economic school and the ideological school has raged for the 
better part of a century, and there is no reason to believe it won’t persist. This can be seen even 
in the reaction to an absence of debate. Pauline Maier, a student of Bernard Bailyn and author of 
Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787 – 1788 (2010), gave no reference to 
Charles Beard in her index. As Tom Cutterham, postdoctoral researcher at University of Oxford, 
stated, this could have been taken that scholars no longer need to address Beard’s enormous 
legacy. However, author Seth Cotlar of Tom Paine's America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic 
Radicalism in the Early Republic and Professor of History at Willamette University, called out 
Maier in a William and Mary Quarterly forum in 2013, and criticized her for the “absence of any 
direct engagement” with Beard’s economic thesis. Thus, the debate rages on.27 
                                                          
     26 Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 5. 
     27 Tom Cutterham, “Charles Beard, Economic Interpretation, and History,” The Junto, 
earlyamericanist.com/2013/02/12/Charles-beard-economic-interpretation-and-history. 
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The scope of this work will focus on aspects of constitutional history which neither Beard 
nor Bailyn reckoned with: the ratification debates and the Ninth Amendment. The aim is to 
explore the Natural Law tendencies of both Federalists and Antifederalists. Because of this, 
Bailyn, Wood, Maier, Barnett, and other views from an intellectual history perspective will be 
most represented. Nevertheless, while this writer sees problems with Beard’s economic thesis, it 
is not to be construed as an avowal that it is wholly without merit. Indeed, an economic analysis 
of any historical era brings with it great value. However, as the scope of this work is to focus 
quite closely as to how Natural Law philosophy informed the creation of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights—and the Ninth Amendment most of all—it is understandable that any economic 
perspective, in and of itself, will be lacking. Though this is due to practical constraints, it is also 
due to a very real deficit the economic thesis carries, which is perhaps the largest criticism this 
writer can apply to Beard: the economic thesis of the Constitution separates economic motivation 
from Natural Law ideology. Simply put, economic motivators such as the protection of private 
property and the freedom to profit in an open marketplace are so intrinsically tied to Natural 
Law—just as individual rights of free speech, freedom of conscience, etc.—one cannot be so 
easily detached from the other. This is one of the dilemmas with the interpretation of economic 
determinism. It is inclined to cast economic interests in a vacuum; separate from political or 
philosophical beliefs. Human beings simply do not behave in such a way.  
Economic motivators are very real, and should not be discounted or dismissed out of 
hand. However, proceeding as though economic impetus is not connected to broader beliefs in 
personal liberty, livelihood, individual happiness, and other elements of Natural Law philosophy 
is to ignore how deeply Natural Law theory influenced the lives of the framers. This work 
intends to show how that ideology informed the role of the Federalists in the making of the U.S. 
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Constitution, the establishment of a Bill of Rights by Antifederalists, and the ratification of the 
Ninth Amendment which was designed to appease both factions. 
Natural Law 
Defining terms is crucial when discussing intellectual history, and the history of 
American political thought is no exception. Thus, an exploration and explanation of Natural 
Law, as the framers understood it, is of utmost importance. To do so is, fortunately, somewhat 
simple. It can be seen clearly and powerfully in the words of the founding document of the 
United States: the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson stated emphatically the 
principles of Natural Law when he argued that “We hold these truths to be self-evident that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”28 Thus, rights precede 
government. The words of Jefferson in the Declaration, modified slightly by others—including 
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams—asserts the essence of Natural Law. Rather than the legal 
positivist view that rights are established by statute, and therefore by government, Natural Law 
maintains that legitimate government neither creates, nor takes away, certain inherent rights.  
The Second Treatise on Government by John Locke predates the Declaration of 
Independence by almost a century. The level of Locke’s influence upon the American founding 
has been debated by historians for decades, but his Second Treatise nonetheless states that all 
men are naturally in “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and to dispose of their 
possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking 
                                                          
     28 Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence. For the Record: A Documentary History of America, David 
E. Shi and Holly A Mayer, ed. (New York: Norton, 2013), 119. 
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leave or depending upon the will of any other man.”29 However some may want to argue that 
Jefferson and others were not as influenced by Locke, as has been claimed, similar arguments for 
Natural Law can nevertheless be found in the writings of both men. 
The reason why it is important to note the Natural Law influence upon the framers is 
precisely because the protection of individual rights can be put at risk through democratic means. 
Randy Barnett argues that “The Declaration stipulates that those who govern the people are 
supposed ‘to secure’ their preexisting rights, not impose the will of a majority of the people upon 
the minority…”30 This stance was not unique to Jefferson. Quite the contrary. Only two months 
prior to the Declaration of Independence, George Mason wrote the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights in May of 1776. In it, Mason asserts that “all men are by nature equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights.”31 Thus, Jefferson was not inventing a concept out 
of whole cloth. He was instead calling back to the principles of the Enlightenment, forwarded by 
Europeans like John Locke, and avowing the political zeitgeist of late eighteenth century North 
America by borrowing the language of contemporaries like George Mason. Alexander Hamilton 
asserted Natural Law in 1775, when he argued that the “Sacred Rights of mankind are not to be 
rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in 
the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of Divinity itself, and can never be erased or 
obscured by mortal power.”32 Jefferson, Mason, and Hamilton were recognizing rights not as the 
acquiescence of monarchy or even representative parliament, but as a product of nature. Rights 
                                                          
     29 John Locke. The Second Treatise on Civil Government. For the Record: A Documentary History of America. 
David E. Shi and Holly A Mayer, ed. (New York: Norton, 2013), 84. 
     30 Randy Barnett, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We The People, (New 
York: Broadside Books/Harper Collins, 2016), 42. 
     31 George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights. May, 1776. Library of Congress. 
loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/mason.html. 
     32 Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Edited by Harold C. Syrett (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1961—79), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch3s5.html. 
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are preexisting as they are innumerable and they cannot be justifiably surrendered. Just as the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights made explicit, “inalienable rights cannot be surrendered by 
compact.”33 This worldview is essential to understanding the philosophical bedrock of the 
American founding. 
It might be assumed then that the push for a new Constitution, to replace the Articles of 
Confederation, was perhaps a means of further democratizing the nation; distancing the proposed 
government from the country’s Natural Law tendencies at the time of the Revolution. Such an 
assumption would be a mistake. It was, after all, James Madison, the chief promoter of 
ratification—often referred to as the father of the Constitution—who wrote in 1787 that the 
nation may be growing too democratic. He put his concern about the ill impacts of too much 
democracy into an easy to understand analogy: 
Place three individuals in a situation wherein the interest of each depends on the voice of 
the others, and give to two of them an interest opposed to the rights of the third. Will the 
latter be secure? The prudence of every man would shun the danger. The rules and forms 
of justice suppose and guard against it. Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely 
to encroach on the rights of one thousand?34 
 
Just as Natural Law continued to be championed by Federalists like Madison in 1787, 
Antifederalists similarly emphasized undemocratic principles in their own arguments against 
ratification. Mercy Otis Warren argued in 1788 that “All writers on government agree… that 
man is born free and possessed of certain unalienable rights.”35 She also noted that the new 
                                                          
     33 George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights. May, 1776. Library of Congress. 
loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/mason.html. 
     34 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, April, 1787. National Archives. Founders 
Online. founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-09-02-0187. 
     35 Mercy Otis Warren, “Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions by a 
Columbian Patriot” (Pamphlet, 1788), Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published during Its 
Discussion by the People 1787–1788. ed. Paul Leicester Ford. Brooklyn: Paul Leicester Ford, 1888. 
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Constitution provided no protections for persons regarding “rights of conscience or the liberty of 
the press.”36 Thus, her arguments were not merely for the rights of a vocal majority, but the 
protection of natural rights of individuals.  
This was not unique among Mercy Otis Warren’s arguments. For example, she also 
argued for a decidedly undemocratic policy: term limits. Term limits permeate political debate in 
the United States to the present day. Modern arguments against term limits have included their 
inherently undemocratic nature. It is precisely the “stop me before I vote again” nature of term 
limits that is often denounced by supporters of democratic processes.37 Mercy Otis Warren, on 
the other hand, supported term limits and criticized the new Constitution for not including them. 
There is no provision for a rotation, nor anything to prevent the perpetuity of office in the 
same hands for life; which by a little well timed bribery, will probably be done, to the 
exclusion of men of the best abilities from their share in the offices of government. By 
this neglect we lose the advantages of that check to the overbearing insolence of office, 
which by rendering him ineligible at certain periods, keeps the mind of man in equilibrio, 
and teaches him the feelings of the governed, and better qualifies him to govern in his 
turn.38 
 
Warren underscores the position that democratic limitations can, in fact, bolster and 
strengthen democracy. This paradoxical, yet functional assertion resides at the heart of Natural 
Law. 
John Adams, as early as 1765, emphasized Natural Law when he maintained that rights 
are “antecedent to all earthly governments: rights cannot be repealed or restrained by human 
                                                          
     36 Warren, “Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions by a Columbian 
Patriot” (Pamphlet, 1788). 
     37 This is precisely the argument made by Victor Kamber in his book, Giving Up on Democracy: Why Term 
Limits are Bad for America (Washington, D.C.: Regenery Publishing, 1995). 
     38 Warren, “Observations on the New Constitution,” (Pamphlet, 1788). 
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laws; rights [are] derived from the great legislator of the universe.”39 This demonstrates that 
Adams, himself an advocate for a new Constitution in the 1780s, subscribed to Natural Law 
ideology. Thus, both pro-ratification and anti-ratification factions expressed their arguments 
through a shared Natural Law worldview.  
The Ratification Debates and Rational Fear of Democracy 
The ratification of the U.S. Constitution was a second American revolution. Its existence 
is today taken for granted as though its success was inevitable, even though it endured serious 
and crucial challenges during the Civil War of the 1860s. Because of this common oversight, the 
bitter debates over the Constitution’s ratification have been largely forgotten.40 The ratification 
debates are seldom discussed in public high school history courses, or college courses for that 
matter, and the Constitutional Convention is itself given short shrift much of the time. This is 
unfortunate, because this second American revolution—the ratification of the Constitution—was, 
as much if not more so than the first, a revolution of political philosophy. It was a conversation 
over local control versus national control, liberty versus security, and parity versus 
individualism. It was also, in a number of ways, the realization of the Natural Law tenets 
declared by Mason and Jefferson in 1776. In this regard, it was a revolution which, somewhat 
ironically, simply emphasized the Natural Law arguments already asserted in the Declaration of 
Independence, even as it sought to create a stronger national government. 
                                                          
      39 John Adams, “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” August 12, 1775, Founders Online, National 
Archives, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-01-02-0052-0004. 
     40 The ratification process of the proposed Constitution required state conventions to assemble, deliberate, and 
vote on the Constitution as is. Any alterations promised by Federalists had to be trusted in good faith that 
amendments would be added later. This included concerns over a lack of a Bill of Rights. Nine state conventions 
had to approve ratification of the Constitution for the creation of the new Federal Government to become legally 
legitimate. Any state which voted against ratification would not be a member state of the new Constitutional 
government. Eventually, all thirteen states voted in favor of ratification. 
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The Natural Law view that emerged during the revolution was influenced by the 
Enlightenment and informed by the Glorious Revolution of England in 1688. England’s 
revolution in the late seventeenth century established the primacy of parliament over that of its 
king. Modern interpreters may have trouble seeing the Glorious Revolution as a victory for 
democracy, as the House of Lords and House of Commons were made up of the most privileged, 
land-holding nobles and men of wealth. Nevertheless, it was an historic step forward in 
establishing a foothold for democratic structures in the form of representative government. 
A distinction, however, between the English idea of the people and the American concept 
developed in the new United States in the 1770s and 1780s. Arguably informed by the bitter 
distrust of government which contributed to American independence, a different idea of the 
people came into being: the people and their government—i.e., their representatives, were not 
one and the same. Whereas English Parliament was largely immune from limits on power, 
Americans saw the same threat of abuse of authority in representatives as they did any king. 
Gordon Wood has noted, “The English Bill of Rights was designed to protect the subjects not 
from the power of Parliament but from the power of the king… Parliament was the highest court 
in the land and was therefore the bulwark and guardian of the people’s rights and liberties; there 
was no point in limiting it.”41 Americans had begun to shed this view during the revolutionary 
and post-revolutionary eras. A long history of self-government in the American colonies had also 
instilled a healthy distrust of power. 
This misgiving of authority is important to note, because it was a symptom of a largely 
new American creed: suspicion of too much political power from any source—including the 
                                                          
     41 Gordon S. Wood, “The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic,” Virginia Law Review 8, no. 7 
(October 1999): 1425, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1073871. 
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people themselves. This can be a difficult position for some to comprehend, because it is counter 
to modern prevailing thought which enshrines popular will as the legitimate source of authority. 
Many founders, however—both Federalist and Antifederalist—held suspicion of mob rule to be 
as critical as suspicion of monarchy or oligarchy. American Natural Law was a decisive 
philosophical break from English representative democracy, which held popular will as the 
source of governmental legitimacy—albeit couched in a landed aristocracy. Wood 
acknowledges, “It is important to note that American rights are not merely the rights of the 
people against the power of government; they are the rights of individuals against the power of 
the people themselves.”42 This suspicion of representatives and of popular will informed much of 
the arguments between Federalists and Antifederalists during the ratification debates of 1788. 
Patrick Henry, master rhetorician and one of the major icons of the American Revolution, stated 
“the tyranny of Philadelphia [the federal Convention] may be like the tyranny of George III.’”43 
To some, power—no matter the source—was a threat to individual rights. 
The Antifederalists, by opposing ratification, claimed to be holding true to the essence of 
the patriot cause. They saw themselves as advocates of the principles of American independence 
and viewed the agenda of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and other supporters of the 
Constitution as betrayers of that cause. “[I]n the context of the great mass of ratification 
documents, the antifederalists emerge as the ones who kept the faith—the ancient faith so 
fundamental a part of the ideological origins of the Revolution, from which, they argued, the 
Constitution departed.”44 
                                                          
     42 Gordon S. Wood, “The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic,” 1422. 
     43 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 338. 
     44 Ibid., 331. 
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Antifederalists concerns over the proposed new federal government, were not uniform. 
Some merely wanted to see a Bill of Rights which ensured individual rights and the security of 
certain state powers, while others were vehemently opposed to ratification under any 
circumstances. Their motivations were as varied as their objections, and while many would make 
similar arguments, there was a chasm between those who aimed to see inclusion of a Bill of 
Rights and those who wanted no part of the Constitution whatsoever. As Pauline Maier has 
stated, “the critics of the Constitution were no one thing.”45 
Among the most prominent of the Antifederalists was George Clinton, governor of New 
York. Clinton’s reasons for objecting to the new Constitution may have been the least 
ideological. Clinton was a powerful and successful governor. He wielded enormous executive 
power and made his success without the help of the federal government since the end of the 
Revolutionary War. Maier observes, “New York’s economy pulled out of the depression of the 
mid-1780s and began to prosper—with no help from Congress… That the governor would resist 
giving Congress a right to tax imports, which was at the time an exclusive right of New York, 
was not hard to imagine.”46 The struggle for control between two prominent New Yorkers, 
Antifederalist George Clinton and champion of the proposed Constitution Alexander Hamilton, 
illustrates that the debates over ratification had enormous political, as well as, economic 
ramifications. It is here, when examining the economic and political motivations of those 
opposed to ratification, that the Beardian thesis becomes most credible. Maier maintains that 
“Hamilton and his allies wanted to create a stronger national government in part to counter the 
power of states like Clinton’s New York.”47In this regard, one can see the concerns Federalists 
                                                          
     45 Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2010), 93. 
     46Maier, Ratification, 324. 
     47Ibid., 325. 
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like Hamilton and Madison held toward state officials in much the same way Antifederalists 
harbored suspicion toward a too-powerful national government. Additionally, James Madison 
had proposed during the Convention at Philadelphia that the new national government should 
have the power to veto state laws. This was interpreted as overreach and roundly rejected. Most 
at the convention regarded the proposal as an attempt to encroach upon the legitimate powers of 
the individual state governments. 
Perhaps the most ardent Antifederalist was Mercy Otis Warren. Warren is a particularly 
important figure in the history of the American Revolution. As the wife of James Warren and 
sister of James Otis, Mercy Otis Warren found herself in the middle of patriotic rebellion in 
Massachusetts in the 1760s and 1770s. Her home was an important station of communication, 
helping to facilitate the Committees of Correspondence—the precursor to the Continental 
Congress—during the beginnings of the Revolution. Her specific contribution was also unique. 
She was a gifted playwright and essayist who wrote plays critical of monarchy. Her writings are 
among the first and most influential in overlapping the patriot cause with sympathetic artistic 
sentiment. Her work influenced support for independence. In her later life, she wrote the first 
multi-volume history of the American Revolution. 
Warren viewed the proposed Constitution as antithetical to the values of the Revolution. 
She was not unique in this matter, as Antifederalists often saw themselves as guardians of the 
cause. Bernard Bailyn observes, “The identity between antifederalist thought and that of the most 
fervent ideologists of ’76 is at times astonishing.”48 Warren did not see the Constitution as 
something to be fixed or improved upon. Writing under the pseudonym, “A Columbian 
                                                          
     48 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
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Patriot,”49 Mercy Otis Warren railed against the aims of the Federalists. “’[L]et the sublime 
characters, the philosophic lovers of freedom who have wept over [freedom’s] exit, retire to the 
calm shades of contemplation there… [to] look with pity on the inconsistency of human nature, 
the revolutions of states, the rise of kingdoms, and the fall of empires.’ Warren’s tract stands as 
an impassioned plea that Americans reject the proposed federal government.”50 If a change of 
government at the federal level were to transpire, Warren wanted it rebuilt from the foundation 
up. She saw no hope in the proposed Constitution, nor improving upon it. “I[n] short, she wanted 
the convention to start over from scratch, not, like Richard Henry Lee and many [other 
Antifederalists], to repair the Constitution’s most egregious shortcomings.”51 
Antifederalists stood on a spectrum of opposition, from political differences to 
apprehensions regarding the erosion of state/local sovereignty. These concerns were similar, but 
not always the same. Warren’s concerns were principled and rooted in civic virtue. Cheryl Z. 
Oreovicz observes, “… the vision [Warren] articulates encompasses what historians refer to as 
‘the republican synthesis,’ the commitment of citizens to both public and private virtue in their 
own lives so that the commonwealth may flourish.”52 Civic virtue, and its call for private 
integrity and public duty, informed much of the republicanism of the era. In contrast, George 
Clinton’s incentives were arguably self-serving and motivated by a need to hoard control at the 
state government level—and were not necessarily republican or virtuous in any meaningful 
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sense. It is crucial to consider these distinctions between various Antifederalist arguments and 
motivations for the ratification debates to be properly understood. 
George Mason may well best represent the combination between the civic principles of 
Warren and Clinton’s wishes to retain state power. As previously noted, George Mason had 
already been influential upon the republic with his writing of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
in 1776. He was a Virginia delegate to the Constitutional Convention and refused to sign the 
document due to its lack of a Bill of Rights. Mason feared the supremacy of the proposed 
Constitution over the laws of the states, combined with its lack of enumerated guaranteed rights 
of citizens, would circumvent both state power and individual rights. Further, “Mason feared that 
Congress would abuse the ‘necessary and proper’ clause… to extend its authority so far as to 
threaten the powers retained by the states and rights retained by the people.”53 A number of 
individual state constitutions included a Bill of Rights, or some assertion of rights of the people. 
Mason understandably argued that without a federal Bill of Rights, both the Necessary and 
Proper clause and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution could undermine individual state 
protections of such rights. He argued that “the laws of the general Government being paramount 
to the laws and Constitution of the several States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate States 
are no Security.”54 Considering these factors, he felt obliged to reject the new model of 
government. Pauline Maier affirms, “Without the prospect of a second convention, [Mason] 
declared, he would neither sign the document nor support it in Virginia.”55 Mason’s determined 
argument for the necessity of a Bill of Rights was perhaps the most emblematic of Antifederalist 
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sentiment. He was willing to accept the new federal government, but not without a guaranteed 
protection of rights, and his concern was with preserving the principle of Natural Law.  
Among the most prominent of the Antifederalists were the writings of “Centinel,” 
“Cato,” and “Brutus;” anonymous writers who fervently argued against ratification. The identity 
of these figures has been debated for centuries. Centinel is generally thought to have been 
Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania, or perhaps his father George. Most historians believe Cato to be 
the aforementioned George Clinton. Brutus is generally thought to have been Robert Yates, who 
had been a delegate from New York to the Constitutional Convention. Yates left in disgust 
prematurely because the Convention had strayed so far from its allegedly intended agenda: to 
create improvements to the Articles of Confederation. Once Yates saw that the aims of 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison were to throw the Articles out and start anew, he left.  
Some of the pseudonymed Antifederalists might have been more than a single person, 
much like “Publius” in The Federalist had been three different writers: Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison, and John Jay. Although there were numerous Antifederalist writings, including 
the aforementioned writings of “A Columbian Patriot”/Mercy Otis Warren, a need to limit the 
focus of these is necessary for the practical purposes of this work. It should not, therefore, be 
taken that these writings—or these authors—are exhaustive. 
Antifederalist arguments brought the need for enumerated, protected rights to the 
forefront. Centinel, in his second essay, argued for the protection of a free press. “As long as the 
liberty of the press continues unviolated, and the people have the right of expressing and 
publishing their sentiments upon every public measure, it is next to impossible to enslave a free 
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nation.”56 A free press, able to publish even the most unpopular and antiauthoritarian views, 
secures liberty for all and keeps the people’s representatives in check. It is both a means of 
protecting democratic sentiment, but also a protection for those who hold unpopular opinions. 
Centinel also defended the right to worship according to one’s individual conscience. The 
protection of such right, it was stated, required a specified guarantee at the federal level. “[T]here 
is no declaration [in the Constitution], that all men have a natural and unalienable right to 
worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and 
understanding…”57 These concerns sustained the right of individual speech and individual 
worship against the prerogatives of the state. Centinel similarly stated the concerns of George 
Mason, “[T]he security of the personal rights of the people by the state constitutions is 
superseded and destroyed, hence results the necessity of such security being provided for by a 
bill of rights to be inserted in the plan of federal government.”58 
Cato also stated objections similar to those of George Mason. Mason stated that “there 
never was a government over a very extensive country without destroying the liberties of the 
people…”59 Cato, like Mason, summoned the arguments of French Enlightenment philosopher 
Montesquieu. “Montesquieu observes, that ‘the course of government is attended with an 
insensible descent to evil, and there is no reascending to good without very great efforts.’ The 
plain inference from this doctrine is, that rulers in all governments will erect an interest separate 
from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them.”60 Again, a distrust of government—
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including representative government, is at issue. While some today may want to see such 
apprehension as paranoiac, it was a reasonable suspicion by those who had only recently thrown 
off the shackles of monarchy.61 
The figure who most artfully and directly combated the ratification of the Constitution 
and the arguments for its support by the Federalists was Brutus. Named after one of the prime 
conspirators who assassinated Caesar to save the Roman republic, the Antifederalist Brutus was 
an impressive intellectual force to friend and foe alike. Pauline Maier observes, “Both ‘Cato’ and 
‘Centinel’ expressed admiration for [Brutus’s] ‘masterly’ arguments. Even The Federalist… 
recognized ‘Brutus’ as a formidable opponent by answering him, though without acknowledging 
him by name.”62 
It is indeed the writings of Brutus which may ring most similar to that of classical liberals 
and libertarians today. His predictions appear outright prophetic when he writes, in essay number 
XII, that the Constitution’s preamble would “authorise the Congress to do any thing which in 
their judgment will tend to provide for the general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as 
general and unlimited powers of legislation in all cases.”63 Brutus’s misgivings here appear to 
hinge upon the potential of unfettered federal power—regardless of any possible popular 
sentiment.  
 Supporters of the Constitution similarly made many of their arguments by employing 
antidemocratic positions. Many of the essays known as The Federalist, written by Alexander 
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Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, were explicitly critical of democracy. Federalist no. 10, 
written by Madison, states that “democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and 
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; 
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.”64  
Similarly, The Federalist asserts the need for liberal republican government precisely to 
ward off those who may take office and attempt to bend power to themselves for their own 
selfish aims. “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”65 Madison’s defense of 
longer terms for Senators and the political dominance they would hold, versus that of the House 
of Representatives, in their advise and consent role and ratification of treaties was thus, 
“assemblies yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious 
leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions… a body which is to correct this infirmity 
ought itself to be free from it…”66 The impulse of sudden passions from the electorate or from 
leadership could improperly sway the direction of Congress, and Federalists wanted to assure 
such fleeting passions were kept in check. This was also why the Senate was to be one step 
removed from the election of the people and were to be instead representatives of the individual 
states. Professor of Law, Frank B. Cross, acknowledges, “By being less immediately 
majoritarian, the Senate would foster stability in government.”67 This check the Senate was 
designed to have against the impulse of sudden and violent passions was ostensibly removed 
with the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 through the direct election of Senators. 
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Safeguard Against Democracy: Independent Courts 
Perhaps the most crucial undemocratic function of the U.S. government is the 
independence of the courts. The independence of the judiciary was not new when the 
Constitution was proposed. As with much of the qualities of the proposed federal government, an 
independent judiciary was a key element of state governments, and had been championed by 
figures such as John Adams from the earliest days of the American Revolution. The 
undemocratic, indeed antidemocratic nature of an independent judiciary—especially at the level 
of the Supreme Court—was another check against the momentary appetites and legislative 
whims of the people and their representatives.  
Brutus, in essay XI, shared the same fear of the Supreme Court as he did of the national 
legislature. “They will give the sense of every article of the constitution… in their decisions they 
will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to 
what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution.”68 It is worth noting that Brutus 
condemns the new constitution for the potential power of its democratically elected body, the 
Congress, as well as its undemocratic body, the judiciary. However, history has proven Brutus to 
some degree correct when he asserts in essay XI that “the judicial power of the United States, 
will lean strongly in favour of the general government…”69  
Nevertheless, the alternative would be for courts to be beholden to public opinion and/or 
legislative rule. This has been referred to in the modern era as judicial deference or judicial 
restraint. The opposite of which, so-called judicial activism, is seen in the present age as 
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verboten. The irony of Brutus’s criticism of the independent judiciary, of course, is that it is the 
very independence of the courts which secure the liberties Brutus and other Antifederalists were 
concerned about. When John Marshall firmly established the federal precedent of judicial review 
in the Marbury v. Madison decision in 1803, he was properly asserting the co-equal power of the 
Supreme Court to judge the constitutionality of federal statutes.70 Regardless of the protests by 
figures like Thomas Jefferson that Marshall read into the Constitution a power the Supreme 
Court was never explicitly given—without such power, the Court would neither be co-equal, nor 
independent. In the twentieth century, Justice Robert H. Jackson commented on this principle in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). “Justice Jackson provided a classic 
explication of the minoritarian argument for judicial review… ‘the very purpose of a Bill of 
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials…”71  
It is indeed the brilliance of judicial independence at the highest level of the federal 
government, an inherently undemocratic system, which helps to preserve individual liberties. 
Francis Edward Devine observes, “Judicial review, in itself, is postulated on the possibility of 
overriding democratically elected legislatures in the interest of indefeasible rights.”72 Such 
assertions have grown unpopular in academic circles in recent decades. Whether this is due to 
prevailing political ideology in academe or an assumed elitism implied in undemocratic methods, 
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is not entirely clear. What is clear, however, is that while the democratic elements of the United 
States system of government have been applauded; indeed, celebrated—its undemocratic 
safeguards have been ignored or deliberately avoided. This is despite the civil liberties which 
have been protected and even expanded due to their presence. This is the irony of the American 
republican system: undemocratic safeguards have strengthened American democracy. By 
empowering individual rights, the rights of all are reinforced. The alternative, pure democracy—
something occasionally advocated for in the modern age, would instead be indebted to the 
shifting biases of a sizable tyranny. As Devine acknowledges, “If the majority were to rule, 
rights viewed as fundamental in the American tradition would be, at least at times, abolished.”73 
The Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment 
 In the late 1780s, arguments against a Bill of Rights were properly reasoned in Natural 
Law just as arguments for a Bill of Rights had been. An exploration of this will be discussed 
below. What must first be understood beforehand, however, is that—to some reasonable 
degree—the Bill of Rights is, by design, a list—in part—of  undemocratic principles set out to 
protect individuals. “The supremacy of the people does not secure the rights of individuals and 
minorities against the majority…a bill of rights in a republican form is to serve as a check 
against majority faction.”74 Why then, some may ask, would anyone argue against a Bill of 
Rights?  
Federalist 84 states, “bills of rights… are not only unnecessary in the proposed 
Constitution, but would be dangerous… For why declare that things shall not be done [by 
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Congress] which there is no power to do?”75 Federalist James Wilson made the same argument at 
the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention on November 28th, 1787. “If we attempt an enumeration 
[of rights], everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is that an 
imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government, and the 
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.”76 This is, at the very least, sound 
argumentation, and certainly underscores a belief in Natural Law theory. It is an understandable 
and reasonable claim that the listing of rights could set a negative precedent.  
James Madison soon enough proposed a list of enumerated rights to be added to the 
Constitution during the earliest days of the new federal government. Madison, himself, had not 
seen a need for a bill of rights, but his friend Thomas Jefferson argued in a letter to Madison in 
late 1787 that “a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on 
earth, general or particular and what no just government should refuse, or rest on 
inference.”77Jefferson’s reasoning resonated and convinced Madison to champion a bill of rights 
during the first session of the newly-established House of Representatives in 1789. Against the 
protests of other Federalists, Madison sought the addition of a Bill of Rights to appease the 
concerns Antifederalists had made during debates over ratification. During his floor speech, 
Madison stated:  
It has been objected… that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of [federal] 
power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it 
might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended 
to be assigned into the hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure. 
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This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission 
of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.78 
 
 As a result, among the amendments Madison proposed was the prototype which would, 
with some separation and modification, become the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. The proposal tied together the issue of retained rights and the powers left to 
the states and the people. Eventually, the matter of rights retained by the people and powers 
reserved to the states were unglued and made into two separate amendments. In this regard, the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments are unique, as they are the only ones that were the result of the 
ratification debates specifically. Unlike the first eight amendments that assert explicit individual 
rights, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were informed by the concerns espoused by Federalists 
as well as Antifederalists. The Ninth Amendment, however, is exceptional because it addresses 
the Natural Law assertion of unenumerated rights specifically. The Ninth Amendment states that 
the “enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”79 Ratified in 1791 as part of the first ten amendments, 
known as the Bill of Rights, it makes clear the Natural Law premise of the framers.  
Ninth Amendment Scholarship and Legal Precedent 
 Adding to the Ninth Amendment’s unique nature and legacy is the long state of 
dormancy in which it rested for well over a century and a half. Though the amendment was 
ratified in 1791, it would not receive much study by legal theorists, political scientists, or 
historians until the twentieth century. In the 1920s, political scientist and Princeton professor, 
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Edward S. Corwin, discussed the Ninth Amendment and its relation to Natural Law in some of 
his work. Corwin deconstructed the nature of the nation’s devotion to the Constitution and found 
the legitimacy of it not in the legal positivism emerging in twentieth century political thought, 
but in the Natural Law enlightenment values underpinning the nation’s founding. Corwin stated 
that “the legality of the Constitution, its supremacy, and its claim to be worshipped, alike find 
common standing ground on the belief in a law superior to the will of human governors.”80 
Despite Corwin’s scholarship, no monograph dedicated to the exclusive study of the 
Ninth Amendment was published until 1955, by Bennet B. Patterson. The title of Patterson’s 
book alone was quite revealing: The Forgotten Ninth Amendment. In it, Patterson asserted the 
amendment’s relationship to individual rights against the federal government as well as the 
states. He argued that a “careful analysis of the Ninth Amendment will reveal that the Ninth 
Amendment cannot be classified as a restrictive clause at all, because it is on the contrary a great 
declaration of the rights of natural endowment.”81 This view is alternately challenged and 
championed by scholars in the twenty-first century, as is discussed below. Patterson, however, 
made clear his view that any interpretation that the Ninth Amendment merely left rights retained 
to the separate states, and not individuals, was wholly misguided. Such misunderstanding 
undermines the Natural Law tenet the amendment was designed to secure.  
We have a choice of the theory of liberty and rights by natural endowment as announced 
in the Declaration of Independence, and again in the Ninth Amendment, and in the other 
liberty documents, or we have the choice of the theory that all of our inherent and 
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fundamental rights were surrendered to State governments and that the governments of 
the States are the creators of our rights and liberties.82 
Patterson articulates that any presumption that the Ninth Amendment’s reference to 
retained rights somehow alludes to state powers is disingenuous. Such a claim undermines the 
Natural Law concerns shared by Federalists and Antifederalists of the 1780s. This flawed claim, 
further discussed below, is also absurd because the Ninth Amendment addresses rights retained 
by the people while the Tenth Amendment addresses powers reserved to the states. The rights 
retained connects to state powers thesis is thus not worthy of any serious consideration. This, 
however, has not stopped some scholars in the twenty-first century from reclaiming and re-
asserting new versions of the argument, as will be discussed momentarily. Patterson, however, in 
1955, was a voice in the wilderness regarding Ninth Amendment scholarship, and similar 
scholarship would not achieve substantial significance for several more years. 
The Ninth Amendment was similarly avoided in the world of American jurisprudence 
until the second half of the twentieth century. Suddenly, however, in the Supreme Court case of 
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which concerned the use of birth control among married 
couples, the court’s majority ruled that a right of privacy emanated from certain constitutional 
protections. More explicitly, in a concurring opinion, Justice Arnold Goldberg cited the Ninth 
Amendment in his support of the court’s ruling.83One hundred and seventy-four years after it 
was ratified, the Ninth Amendment and its assertion of Natural Law was proclaimed by the 
Supreme Court. The ramifications were enormous on subsequent cases. For example, a turning 
point was made in Griswold which set the precedence for federal abortion rights in the Roe v. 
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Wade (1973) decision, as well as free speech/free press issues in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia (1980). 
The Ninth Amendment became a matter of discussion again in the 1980s during the 
confirmation hearings of Robert Bork, who was nominated to the Supreme Court by President 
Ronald Reagan in 1987. During the hearings, Bork was asked for his views concerning the Ninth 
Amendment. His negative view toward the Ninth Amendment providing legal protection for 
unenumerated rights was among the factors which sunk his nomination. Bork answered, “I do 
not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of what it means… if 
you had an amendment that says ‘congress shall make no’ and then there is an ink blot and you 
cannot read the rest of it… I do not think the court can make up what might be under the ink blot 
if you cannot read it.”84 Bork’s nomination was an utter failure, and his dismissiveness toward 
the Ninth Amendment—and thus, toward Natural Law—played no small part in his undoing. As 
Stephen Macedo stated just a year later, in 1988, “Judge Bork’s unwillingness to regard the ninth 
amendment as anything more than an unintelligible aberration seriously hurt his case in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.”85 The Ninth Amendment thus had gone from something ignored in 
American jurisprudence for the better part of two centuries, to a litmus test for Supreme Court 
confirmation. This trend did not continue, however, and the vocal and overt reverence toward the 
Ninth Amendment seen in the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 1987, soon disappeared from sight as quickly as it had emerged in 1965. Though 
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the Ninth Amendment has flown under the radar in the decades since, it is not truly gone. Since 
Griswold, the Ninth Amendment has been asserted by the court over a thousand times.86 
The debate over the Ninth Amendment’s meaning continued into the twenty-first century, 
with some scholars resurrecting the argument that the amendment doesn’t protect individual 
unenumerated rights. Kurt T. Lash, for example, Professor of Law at University of Richmond, 
has proclaimed, “Instead of being read as a source of individual rights, courts developed the 
Ninth [Amendment] as a tool for preserving state autonomy.”87 There are some serious problems 
with this thesis, however, and Lash has trouble proving his claim. Furthermore, such an 
interpretation renders the Tenth Amendment moot, as it addresses precisely the issue Lash 
purports the Ninth does. The Tenth Amendment states that the “powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”88 Also, Lash misses entirely the historical context of the framers’ 
devotion to Natural Law and suspicion of overtly democratic systems. Randy Barnett, a critic of 
Lash’s collective-rights/state powers thesis, maintains that opposition “to majoritarianism, also 
derisively called ‘democracy’ in this [founding] period, in the form of legislative supremacy was 
repeatedly voiced at the Constitutional Convention.”89 Barnett adds that it is not at all surprising, 
considering the framers’ fear of majoritarian power, legislative or otherwise, that the Bill of 
Rights took on “a decidedly individualist cast.”90 Barnett appears to understand the Natural Law 
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ideology the framers, both Federalist and Antifederalist, were appealing to when they designed 
the Ninth Amendment. 
Thus, this is why it can be said that the Ninth Amendment best represents Natural Law 
synthesis between the Federalists and the Antifederalists. A presumption of preexisting rights on 
both sides of the ratification divide informed both the arguments for a Bill of Rights and for why 
such a listing of rights could be potentially hazardous. The Ninth Amendment addresses both 
concerns implicitly by nodding to the Natural Law creed of both factions. As stated previously, 
when James Madison wrote the Ninth Amendment, he himself had gone through a 
transformation. As a Federalist, he had himself argued against the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. 
However, he came to terms with the fact that the legitimacy of the Constitution and the new 
federal government could be at stake without a Bill of Rights. Madison also received much the 
same argument of the need for such protections by his mentor, Thomas Jefferson. Thus, the 
Natural Law argument for a Bill of Rights combined with the Natural Law argument against it, 
synthesizing in the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Barnett notes that the “Ninth 
Amendment was supposed to ensure that the eight [preceding] amendments protecting rights 
were not exclusive.”91 By folding the Ninth Amendment into the other protected rights 
enumerated, Madison not only satisfied Antifederalist concerns over a lack of a Bill of Rights, 
but he also addressed Federalist concerns about including one. This synthesis, through the Ninth 
Amendment, legitimized both the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights on Natural Law 
grounds. 
Conclusion 
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The ideological lesson of the American founding is seen in the writings of Federalists and 
Antifederalists alike. They never rejected democratic values outright or abandoned the principle 
that legitimate government derives from the consent of the governed. Yet, they were able to 
improve upon this notion by asserting that democracy is, in and of itself—and in its purest form, 
also a tyranny. Both those who created the Constitution and those who demanded a Bill of Rights 
did so by resolutely defending the rights of the individual. “Hence the Constitution and 
especially the Bill of Rights place [rights] beyond the reach of the majority.”92 Doing so, they 
established a more robust democracy by affirming Natural Law values.  
Critics of the Natural Law thesis may be prone to criticize the founders for lacking 
modern sensibilities of racial and gender equality. Some of the framers, including Jefferson, 
Mason, and Madison, can be derided as ideological hypocrites for asserting the equality of all 
men while participating in the institution of slavery. Such criticisms are wholly acceptable and 
warranted. Criticisms, however, become self-defeating when they then attempt to attack Natural 
Law for this moral shortcoming. It is an illogical and absurd notion. For the fact is that such 
shortcomings show a failure in the consistent execution of Natural Law practice and does not 
invalidate Natural Law itself. It is a mistake to confuse the message with the messengers. 
Natural Law informed the creation of the United States Constitution as well as the Bill of 
Rights, and the document’s most explicit expression of Natural Law theory is the Ninth 
Amendment. The Ninth Amendment’s unique place as an enumerated right which protects 
unenumerated rights is ironic as it is exceptional. The fact that the amendment was not utilized 
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explicitly in American law until the second half of the twentieth century further reveals its 
unique position in American constitutional law and academic scholarship. 
To underscore the paradox of a strong democracy built upon the protection of individual 
liberty, the words of John Adams again become appropriate. John Adams was, after all, a strong 
supporter for the rule of law as well as independence of the courts. Yet, it was John Adams, the 
man who had likened democracy to the tyrannical roasting of people alive, who pointed to the 
essence of the intertwined nature of American liberal democracy; the individual and the 
collective. As Bernard Bailyn acknowledges, “For John Adams an essential point was that the 
commons, or the democracy, of society shared too in the execution of laws [with the elites] 
through the institution of trial by jury...”93 Adams recognized, despite his histrionic rhetoric 
about democracy, that it was the democratic participation of citizens in the jury, as well as the 
independence of the courts, which strengthened society and established justice. It is the marriage 
of the two that makes the crucial difference. The jury process democratizes the justice system 
while the independence of the courts shield it, to some extent at least in its design, from political 
agendas; agendas fed by constituencies and voters which are then channeled through elected 
representatives. There is, then, a dichotomy that exists between the democratic process of the 
will of the people in trial courts and the protection of minority interests in appellate courts—most 
specifically the Supreme Court—which do not utilize juries. This shows again how the system of 
American government is a thoughtful balance of both democratic and undemocratic principles. 
Democracy, at its best, represents the will of the people. At its worst, it oppresses 
minority factions. Constitutional protections of individual rights safeguard against such 
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oppression. It was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that challenges to violations of 
Natural Law, including slavery, the suppression of free speech, and other fundamental individual 
rights arose and the brilliance of American liberalism was essentially realized. Many today, 
including religious groups, the LGBT community, Pro-Choice advocates, and free speech 
activists, owe a debt to the independence of the courts, the Natural Law tenet enshrined in the 
Ninth Amendment, and other undemocratic facets of the United States structure of government. 
It has protected freedoms, including freedoms which have not historically had the support of the 
majority. The protection of individual liberties, long held as libertarian values, have established 
protections for political progressives as well, and this should be remembered.  
Whether it was Centinel’s declaration of the right to worship as one’s conscience 
required, Cato’s warnings of government’s tendency toward evil, or Publius’s assertion that 
government should be impervious to the ephemeral whims of the electorate, their contributions 
are extraordinary. Both supporters and opponents of the United States Constitution understood 
the delicate balance between the will of the people and the rights of the individual. That 
understanding embodies the Ninth Amendment. The balance of these two values, with proper 
consideration to each, is essential to a lasting liberal democracy. 
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